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Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond
quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties
who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based
cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying cre-
dential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary.
However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for
which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations
performed during the protocols. In this work we give device-independent security proofs of two-party
cryptography and Position Verification for memoryless devices under different physical constraints
on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation and we show
that security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key
distribution (QKD). One domain is two-party cryptography (2PC), whose goal is to allow two parties Alice and Bob
to solve joint tasks, while protecting an honest party against the actions of a malicious one. Well-known examples of
such tasks are oblivious transfer [1], bit commitment, secure identification and private information retrieval.
Another interesting application is position-based cryptography (PBC) whose goal is to use the geographical location
of an entity as its (only) credential. At the heart of these is the task of position-verification (PV) where a person wants
to convince the (honest) verifiers that she is located at a particular location. Quantum protocols for PV that make
use of quantum communication to enhance the security have been proposed [2–6]. We will refer to such protocols as
quantum position-verification (PV).
Unfortunately, one cannot achieve secure 2PC and PV without making assumptions on the power of the adversary,
even using quantum communication [4, 7, 8]. This is in stark contrast to QKD where security against an all-powerful
adversary (obeying the laws of physics) is attainable. The reason can be traced back to a key difference between the
two scenarios: while in QKD Alice and Bob can cooperate to check on the actions of the eavesdropper, in 2PC they
do not trust each other and need to fend for themselves.
Nevertheless, due to the practical importance of 2PC one is willing to make assumptions in order to achieve security.
Classically, one often relies on computational hardness assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
However, as technology progresses the validity of such assumptions diminishes: it has been proven that factoring can
be efficiently done on a quantum computer. Most significantly, an adversary can retroactively break the security of a
past execution of a cryptographic protocol [9]. It turns out, however, that security can also be achieved from certain
physical assumptions [10, 11]. The advantage of these comes from the fact that physical assumptions only need to
hold during the course of the protocol. That is, even if the assumption is invalidated at a later point in time, security
is not compromised.
If we allow quantum communication, one possible physical assumption is the bounded quantum-storage model [12,
13], and more generally, the noisy-storage model [14, 15]. Here, the adversary is allowed to have an unlimited amount
of classical storage, but his ability to store quantum information is limited. This is a relevant assumption since
reliable storage of quantum information is challenging. Significantly, however, security can always be achieved by
sending more qubits than the storage device can handle. Specifically, if we assume that the adversary can store at
most r qubits, then security can be achieved by sending n qubits, where r ≤ n − O(log n) [14], which is essentially
optimal since no protocol can be secure if r ≥ n [16, 17]. The corresponding quantum protocols require only very
simple quantum states and measurements – and no quantum storage – to be executed by the honest parties, and their
feasibility has been demonstrated experimentally [18, 19]. It is known that the noisy-storage model allows protocols
for tasks such as oblivious transfer, bit commitment, as well as position-based cryptography [2–6].
In all these security proofs, however, one assumes perfect knowledge of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In
other words, we know precisely what measurements the devices make, or what quantum states they prepare. Here, we
present a general method to prove security for 2PC and PV, even if we only have limited knowledge of the quantum
devices. Chiefly, we assume that the quantum devices function as black boxes, into which we can only give a classical
input, and record a classical output. The classical input indicates the choice of a measurement that we would wish to
perform, although we are not guaranteed that the device actually performs this measurement. The classical output
can be understood as the outcome of that measurement. The classical processing itself is assumed to be trusted. This
idea of imagining black box devices is known as device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography [20–23]. There is
a large body of work in DI QKD (see e.g. [24–26]), but in contrast there is hardly any work in DI 2PC. A protocol
has been proposed by Silman [27] for bit commitment which does not make physical assumptions, and hence only
achieved a weak primitive. First steps towards DI PV have also been made in [28], and for one-sided DI QKD in [5].
Achieving DI security for 2PC and PV presents us new with challenges which require a different approach than
what is known from QKD [29].
1. In QKD Alice and Bob trust each other, while Eve is an eavesdropper trying to break the protocol. As in DI
QKD we will assume that the devices used in the protocol are made by the dishonest party.
2. In QKD, after Eve has prepared and given the devices – which she might be entangled with – to Alice and Bob,
there is no more direct communication between them and Eve. On the contrary in two party cryptography, the
dishonest party, who prepared the devices, will receive back quantum communication from these devices. This
3feature leads to different security analysis between DI QKD and DI 2PC, and also requires us to develop new
proof techniques.
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Table I. Comparison of the proof techniques used in [29] with those of this paper. Our new work relates the security directly
to the entanglement cost of the adversary’s storage channel, however, we borrow concepts on how to test our quantum devices
from the earlier work. Security is possible whenever Pguess ≤ 2−αn (see equation (1)) for some α > 0, which depends on the
dimension d of the adversary’s storage device as well as the parameter ζ estimated during the Bell test. Our new analysis
allows to prove security for a storage device that is at least twice as large as the one allowed by the previous results.
In this paper, we present a general method for proving the device-independent security of two-party cryptography
and position-verification. Specifically, we improve the device-independent security proof of 2PC (which implies security
for PV) in the noisy-storage model (or noisy-entanglement model) given in [29] thanks to new techniques. We
accomplish this by introducing an appropriate model for DI in these settings, and subsequently studying a general
"guessing game" that can be related to both tasks. To obtain DI security, we perform a Bell test on a subset of the
quantum systems used in the protocol. It is an appealing feature of our analysis that security can be attained for any
violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) inequality [30].
A previous analysis [29] permitted us to prove a bound on the cheating probability proportional to the dimension of
the adversary’s quantum storage (see Table I). To do so, they first reduce the dishonest party to a classical adversary
thanks to an entropy inequality. Then they use the absolute effective anti-commutator to prove some uncertainty
relations and finally lower bound some min-entropy (which is equivalent to upper-bound the cheating probability).
Here we deal directly with a quantum adversary, which permits us to prove security for an adversary quantum
memory that is at least twice as large as in the previous analysis. To overcome the difficulties induced by dealing
directly with the adversary quantum memory we had to use different tools (see Table I). While the adversary can
be fully general during the course of the protocol, we assume in this work that the devices he prepared earlier
are memoryless, which means that the devices behave in the same manner every time they are used. By analogy
to classical random variables such devices are often referred to as i.i.d. devices (which stands for independent and
identically distributed).
A. Weak String Erasure
To analyse 2PC protocols, we focus on a simpler primitive called Weak String Erasure (WSE) [15]. WSE is a
two-party primitive such that if Alice and Bob are honest then at the end of its execution Alice holds a random bit
string x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob holds a random substring xI of x where I is a random subset of {1, 2, . . . , n}. WSE is
secure for honest Bob if Alice cannot guess the set I better than random chance, and for honest Alice if it is hard
for Bob to guess the entire Alice’s string i.e. if the probability that X = X˜ is low, where X is the random variable
corresponding to Alice’s output measurement and X˜ is the random variable corresponding to Bob’s guess, that is
∃α > 0 : Hmin(X|Bob) ≥ αn
⇔ ∃α > 0 : Pguess(X|Bob) = 2−Hmin(X|Bob) ≤ 2−αn. (1)
For a more formal security definition of (α, )-WSE see [15].
One possible implementation of WSE [15] in case of honest parties and trusted devices is as follows. Alice prepares
n EPR entangled pairs, measures randomly half of all the pairs in BB84 [31] bases θ ∈ {0, 1}n and gets x ∈ {0, 1}n.
At the same time, she sends the other half to honest Bob who measures it in some random bases θ′ ∈ {0, 1}n and
gets z ∈ {0, 1}n. As Bob does not know θ, he has measured some of his states in the wrong basis, so the outcome
4bits corresponding to these measurements provide no information about Alice’s outcome. At this stage, Bob does
not know which of his measurement were done in the good basis and which were done in the wrong one. After Alice
and Bob have waited for a duration ∆t, Alice sends θ to Bob. Bob can now compare θ with θ′ and deduce the set
I := {k ∈ {0, . . . , n} : θk = θ′k} of indexes where Bob’s bases are the same as Alice’s ones. For these indexes we
have zk = xk and Bob erases all the other bits. At this stage Bob holds (I, xI), where xI is the substring of x
corresponding to the set I.
In the device-independent version of the protocol Alice holds two devices: the main device and the testing device.
Alice uses the main device to prepare and measure states, and the testing device to measure states. In the honest
scenario, Alice first tests her devices by proceeding to a Bell test following Protocol 2 (in section IIA), i.e. Alice
checks that the states produced and measurements performed by the main device can be used to violate the CHSH
inequality. Then Alice and Bob proceed as in the trusted device protocol.
It is easy to check that WSE is secure for honest Bob, since the set I is determined by θ ⊕ θ′ (⊕ is the bitwise
addition modulo two) and θ′ is chosen uniformly at random by Bob. As he does not give Alice any information about
it, the probability of Alice successfully guessing I is 2−n.
In the dishonest Bob scenario, we can assume that it is Bob who created Alice’s devices to gain extra information
and compromise Alice’s security. Consequently, at the very beginning of the protocol, Alice needs to test her devices.
She then uses the device n times to produce a bipartite state ρAB = σ⊗nAB (i.i.d. assumption), where σAB is an unknown
but fixed state, measures the ρA part to get x ∈ {0, 1}n and sends the ρB part to Bob. Bob can proceed to any kind
of operation not necessarily i.i.d. on ρB and stores the outcome for the duration ∆t to get a cq-state ρKB′ . When he
receives θ from Alice he performs a general measurement on his cq-state which produces the guess x˜. Bob’s cheating
is considered successful if x˜ = x. However, as his quantum storage is assumed to be bounded (or noisy) which impose
a restriction on the possible state Bob can hold, and permits us to show that,
• WSE is secure: for Alice against dishonest Bob who holds a noisy storage device and is allowed to create the
honest party’s devices (but these devices have to be memoryless), and for Bob against dishonest Alice.
The detailed Weak String Erasure protocol is presented in section IIIA (Protocol 10). The precise formal result is
presented in the Lemma 15 in section IIIA. This result is derived from the technical result informally presented in
the method section IC.
B. Position Verification
PV has three protagonists in the honest scenario, namely two verifiers V1 and V2 and one prover P . For simplicity
we restrict to position verification in one spatial dimension. The prover claims to be at some geographical position,
and the PV protocol permits to prove whether this is true. The protocol is then secure if the probability that one or
more dishonest provers impersonate a prover in the claimed position decays exponentially with the number of qubits
exchanged in the protocol.
When the devices are trusted and the prover is honest, we can implement the protocol as follows. V1 prepares n
EPR entangled pairs, measures half of all the pairs in some bases θ ∈ {0, 1}n to get x ∈ {0, 1}n, and sends the other
half to the prover P . V2 sends θ to P ; this random string can be preshared between the verifiers before the protocol
begins. When the prover receives all the information, he measures the halves of the EPR pairs he received in the
bases θ to get x and sends it back to both verifiers. The verifiers then check whether the prover’s answer is correct,
and measure the time it took between the moment they sent information and the moment they receive the answer
from the prover. If the answer is correct and if the prover replies within a predefined time ∆t, then the execution of
the protocol is considered successful.
The honest execution of the device-independent version of the protocol is the same except that V1 starts with a
Bell test of his main device using the testing device. Then he executes the exact same steps as described above. The
detailed protocol is given as Protocol 16 in section III B.
In the dishonest scenario, a single prover cannot cheat because he cannot reply on time to both verifiers. More than
one dishonest prover is required and, without loss of generality, we can consider at most two dishonest provers whose
goal is to impersonate one honest prover who would be at the claimed position. In this case there exists a general
attack on the protocol [4]. This attack, however, requires an exponential amount of entanglement with respect to the
amount of quantum information received from the verifiers. Hence, it is natural to ask if security is possible when the
adversaries hold a limited amount of entanglement. We will work in this framework of cheating provers.
As security of PV can be reduced to the security of WSE, we prove that
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Figure 1. V1 uses θ as an input to his device, which creates a bipartite state ρAP and sends the part ρP to the prover P , and
measures the other part ρA to produce x ∈ {0, 1}n as output. At the same time V2 sends θ to P . When P receives the state
and θ he makes a measurement on the state and obtains y ∈ {0, 1}m. He sends y to both verifiers. The verifiers check if y = x
(or if y is "close enough" to x), and measure the time it took to get back an answer from P
• PV is secure against adversaries who share a "noisy" entangled state and who cannot use quantum commu-
nication but are allowed to create the honest party’s devices (these devices have to be memoryless).
The precise formal result is presented in Lemma 19, and this follows from a technical result informally presented
in the next section.
C. Methods
In order to prove DI security for Weak String Erasure and Position Verification, we analyse a related task known
as the post-measurement guessing game. This is a two-player game where Alice plays against Bob. Alice inputs a
bit string into her main device and receives an output string; Bob wins the game if he guesses correctly the output
of Alice’s device given his knowledge of Alice’s input.
In the DI version, Alice demands that she has another test device different from her main device and dishonest Bob
is allowed to create these two devices of Alice (Fig. 3). Alice can use these two devices to perform a Bell test (CHSH
game), which certifies the quality of the devices. Having tested her devices, Alice uses the main device to prepare
a bipartite (arbitrary) state and measures half of it by inputting θ ∈ {0, 1}n in her main device, gets an outcome
x ∈ {0, 1}n, and sends the other part of the quantum system to Bob. Later she sends him the input she used to
perform her measurements. Once Bob has received all information he has to guess Alice’s measurement outcome x.
To find a bound on Bob’s winning probability, we have to assume that Bob has limited quantum storage or else he
wins with certainty: he would just have to store the quantum system until he receives the bases θ and then he can
measure his system in those bases. As a first step towards security against fully uncharacterized devices, we assume
for now that all devices used by Alice are memoryless or i.i.d., so they behave in the same way each time Alice uses
them. This implies that Alice’s measurement operators are a tensor product of binary measurement operators, and
the state she prepares is also of product form. This memoryless assumption also permits Alice to perform the Bell
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Figure 2. Security is possible for any violation of the CHSH inequality, but depending on the violation we need to send a larger
number of qubits n.
test before the actual guessing game, and from this test, to estimate an upper bound ζ := S4
√
8− S2 on a quantity
we call the effective absolute anti-commutator of Alice’s measurement denoted + [29], where S is the left hand side
of the CHSH inequality. Since + is always larger than the effective anti-commutator, one can show that it gives rise
to strong uncertainty relations [32].
Despite the memoryless assumption (on Alice side only), the problem remains hard. Indeed, we cannot use tech-
niques coming from DI QKD, since in QKD the honest parties do not send back quantum information to the eavesdrop-
per, in contrast to the guessing game. The analysis must be different. As we do not know what Alice’s measurements
are, there is no limitation on the dimension on which Alice’s devices act, so we cannot use bounds depending on the
dimensionality of Alice’s states or measurements. Moreover we have to express the absolute anti-commutator + of
Alice’s measurement, in a way that allows us to relate it to Bob’s guessing probability. In the previous work on DI
WSE [29], the authors reduced the problem to proving security against a classical adversary (see Table I for a more
detailed comparison between the papers). This reduction leads to a bound which is proportional to d, the dimension
of the adversary’s quantum memory. To improve this bound we must deal with Bob’s measurement, which are fully
general though acting on a space of dimension at most d.
We overcome these difficulties thanks to Jordan’s Lemma [33, 34], which permits to block diagonalize Alice’s
measurement and reduces the dimensionality of these measurements into a list of qubit measurements. The price to
pay is that we lose the "identically distributed" part of the i.i.d. assumption on these qubit measurements. Jordan’s
Lemma permits us to express the absolute effective anti-commutator in an adapted form, such that we can link it to
the guessing probability of Bob. Finally we prove the following.
• Main technical result: Assuming Alice’s devices are memoryless, and Bob has a noisy storage device, there is
a DI upper-bound on the success probability of Bob in the guessing game, which decays exponentially in n, the
length of Alice’s measurement outcomes x ∈ {0, 1}n which coincides here with the number of qubits exchanged
in the honest execution protocol. This bound holds for any CHSH violation, i.e. ∀S ∈]2, 2√2] (see Fig. 2).
The precise formal statement is given in Theorem 8.
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Figure 3. Alice is in possession of two devices prepared by Bob: The "main device" permits Alice to prepare a bipartite state
ρAB and measure the ρA part of it according to a list of bases θ ∈ {0, 1}n. The "testing device" measures according to a list
of bases t ∈ {0, 1}m. These two devices are assumed to be memoryless (or i.i.d.). A dishonest Bob is assumed to be only lim-
ited by the dimension of his quantum memory, so he is allowed to make arbitrary measurements on states of dimension at most d.
The main device prepares a bipartite state ρAB = σ⊗nAB (the tensor form follows the i.i.d. assumption), one part ρA is
measured by the main device, with the measurement settings specified by a random bit string θ ∈ {0, 1}n, to produce the bit
string x ∈ {0, 1}n. The other part ρB of the state is sent to a switch that Alice controls. As the devices are memoryless, Alice
can first test her devices, and so sets her switch such that the system B is sent to the testing device. She then repeatedly
performs the CHSH test to estimate the violation. After that she sets her switch so that the system B is sent to Bob. Bob’s
goal is to guess Alice’s output x, i.e. he wants to achieve x˜ = x.
From this result follows the DI security of WSE and PV. Indeed any attack on WSE can be viewed as a guessing
game where Bob tries to guess Alice’s complete string x. Likewise in the case of PV we can see any attack as a
guessing game: the dishonest provers have to guess V1’s outcome, and one can map the operations they used to the
guessing game and hence show that these operations would permit Bob to win the guessing game. This implies that
the cheating probability in PV is lower than that of the guessing game. This statement has been shown in [6] (the
remapping was done between attacks on PV and attacks on WSE, but it is essentially the same since any attack on
WSE can be seen as a guessing game).
II. DEVICE-INDEPENDENT GUESSING GAME
A. Preliminaries
1. Notation
We denote HA the Hilbert space of the system A with dimension |A| and HAB := HA⊗HB the Hilbert space of the
composite system, with ⊗ the tensor product. By L(H), Sa(H), P(H) and S(H) we mean the set of linear, self-adjoint,
positive semidefinite and (quantum) density operators on H, respectively. For two operators A,B ∈ Sa(H), A ≥ B
means (A−B) ∈ P(H). If ρAB ∈ S(HAB) then we denote ρA := trB(ρAB) and ρB := trA(ρAB) to be the respective
reduced states. A measurement, or POVM for positive operator valued measure, of dimension d is a set of positive
semidefinite operators that adds up to the identity operator on dimension d, namely
F =
{
Fx, x ∈ X : Fx ∈ P(H) and
∑
x
Fx = 1d
}
.
For M ∈ L(H), we denote |M | :=
√
M†M and the Schatten p-norm ‖M‖p := tr(|M |p)1/p for p ∈ [1,∞[. Norms
without subscript will mean the Schatten ∞-norm (also known as the operator norm): ‖M‖ := ‖M‖∞, which is the
largest singular value of M ; if M ∈ P(H) then ‖M‖ is the highest eigenvalue of M . Some useful properties of the
8operator norms are ‖L‖2 = ‖L†L‖ = ‖LL†‖ for all L ∈ L(H) and if A,B ∈ P(H) such that A ≥ B then ‖A‖ ≥ ‖B‖.
Moreover, whenever A,B,L ∈ L(H) and A†A ≥ B†B then ‖AL‖ ≥ ‖BL‖ [5, Lemma 1].
Vector p-norms induce the corresponding operator p-norms, which we denote as ‖ · ‖Ip to distinguish them from
Schatten p-norms. They are defined as
‖A‖Ip = sup
x 6=0
‖Ax‖p
‖x‖p . (2)
In the proof of a technical Lemma in the appendix, we will need the induced 1-norm and ∞-norm
‖A‖I1 = max
1≤j≤n
m∑
i=1
|aij | and ‖A‖I∞ = max
1≤i≤m
n∑
j=1
|aij | (3)
which can be seen as the maximum absolute column sum and maximum absolute row sum, respectively, and where m
and n are the maximum row and column indexes respectively. Note that the induced 2-norm and the operator norm
are the same ‖ · ‖I2 = ‖ · ‖.
For a bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, |x| denotes its length n and the Hamming weight wH(x) is the number of 1’s in x. For
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n the Hamming distance is defined as dH(x, y) := wH(x⊕ y).
If I is a subset of [n] then by xI we mean the substring of x with indices I.
E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρAB) is the one shot entanglement cost to create a bipartite state ρAB from a maximally entangled state
using only local operations and classical communication. It is formally defined as
E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρ) := minM,Λ
{log(M) : Λ(ΨA¯B¯M ) = ρAB ,Λ ∈ LOCC,M ∈ N}, (4)
where ΨA¯B¯M is a maximally entangled state of dimension M
ΨA¯B¯M := |ΨA¯B¯M 〉〈ΨA¯B¯M |, |ΨA¯B¯M 〉 :=
1√
M
M∑
i=1
|iA¯〉|iB¯〉. (5)
Similarly, we have E(1)C (E) [35, Definition 10] is the one shot entanglement cost to simulate a channel E : L(HA) →L(HB) using LOCC and preshared entanglement:
E
(1)
C (E) := min
M,Λ
{log(M) : ∀ρA ∈ L(HA), Λ(ρA ⊗ΨA¯B¯M ) = E(ρA)} (6)
where Λ is a LOCC with AA¯ → 0 (no output) on Alice’s side and B¯ → B on Bob’s side, and M ∈ N. Note that we
require a single LOCC map to simulate the effect of the channel E so Λ must be independent of ρA.
2. Models and assumptions
In this section we explain in detail the assumptions imposed on the model, which are motivated by considerations
on the WSE and PV protocols and our i.i.d. constraint.
Assumptions 1. These are the assumptions on our device-independent guessing game:
1. In device-independent protocols, the security cannot rely on the knowledge we have about the devices used by
the honest party (the inner workings are unknown). These devices may even be maliciously prepared by the
dishonest party to compromise security. Thus in this context, Bob is allowed to create the two devices of Alice:
the main device and the testing device. These devices are assumed to be memoryless (or i.i.d.), which means
that they behave in the same way every time Alice uses them. In other words, the measurements made by the
devices in one round of usage depend only on Alice’s input in this round (and not on previous rounds), and the
state ρAB = σ⊗nAB created by her device has a tensor product form where σAB may be chosen by Bob. The testing
device is used in the testing protocol 2.
2. When Bob receives his state ρB from Alice, we allow him to perform any quantum operation on it. After the
operation the global state can be written as ρAB′K where Alice’s part ρA has a tensor product form, and ρB′K is
an arbitrary qc-state held by Bob such that |B′| ≤ d (see assumptions 5).
93. Alice can test her devices before using them in the protocol as they are memoryless. We describe the testing
procedure in detail in the following Protocol 2.
The testing procedure aims to estimate how much the two binary measurements made by Alice’s main device are
incompatible given the prepared state. This is accomplished by measuring how much the main and test devices can
violate the CHSH inequality.
Protocol 2. Let A0, A1 be the two binary observables of Alice’s main measurement device, and T0, T1 be the two
binary observables of her testing device.
1. Alice creates a bipartite state ρAB using her main device.
2. She sends the B subsystems in state ρB to her testing device and statistically estimates S := tr(WρAB), where
W is the CHSH operator defined as
W := A0 ⊗ T0 +A0 ⊗ T1 +A1 ⊗ T0 −A1 ⊗ T1. (7)
The following Lemma 4 shows that this testing procedure permits Alice to estimate the absolute effective anti-
commutator defined as follows.
Definition 3. For two binary measurements with POVM elements {P 00 , P 01 } and {P 10 , P 11 }, we define the absolute
effective anti-commutator
+ :=
1
2
tr(|{A0, A1}|ρA) (8)
where A0 := P 00 − P 01 and A1 := P 10 − P 11 .
Lemma 4 (Proposition 2 of [29]). Let ρAT ∈ S(HAT ) and let A0, A1 and T0, T1 be binary observables on subsystem
A and T , respectively, achieving tr(WρAT ) =: S for S ≥ 2 with W being the CHSH operator. The absolute effective
anti-commutator on Alice’s side satisfies
+ ≤ S
4
√
8− S2 =: ζ ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
This estimation ζ of + is central to our proof. Indeed the security bounds we derive below rely on the fact that
ζ < 1, which means that any Bell violation in the testing procedure leads to security on WSE and PV. In other words
it is enough for Alice to estimate ζ < 1 in the testing procedure to be sure that her devices permit her to execute the
protocols (PV or WSE) securely under
Assumptions 5. We assume that the adversarial or dishonest party cannot have access to an unlimited and perfect
quantum memory or quantum entanglement. More specifically,
1. In the guessing game and in WSE, the adversary will either have a bounded storage or a noisy storage.
2. In PV, the adversary will either have access to bounded entanglement or noisy entanglement.
B. Guessing games and results
In this section, we describe and analyse the perfect and imperfect guessing games. As the name suggests, the
winning condition of the perfect guessing game is more strict than that of the imperfect guessing game. Bounding
the probability that Bob wins the perfect guessing game is the first step to bounding the probability that he wins
the more general imperfect guessing game. The motivation behind the analysis of the imperfect guessing game is to
prove security of WSE and PV even if the protocol is made robust to noise, which is inherent to any experimental
implementation.
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1. Perfect guessing game
We begin with a formal description of the perfect guessing game.
Protocol 6. (Perfect guessing game)
1. Alice creates n identical bipartite states, chooses uniformly at random a string θ ∈ {0, 1}n and measures her kth
register using her main device with input θk to obtain an outcome xk. This measurement produces an outcome
string x ∈ {0, 1}n. At the same time she gives all the B parts to Bob.
2. Alice waits for a duration ∆t before sending her string θ to Bob.
3. Bob tries to guess x using θ and all his available information. In other words, Bob produces an output y and
the (perfect) winning condition is y = x.
Let us analyse this game from the perspective of quantum theory and under the i.i.d. assumption 1. We will go
through each step of the protocol again but with added descriptive comments. In the first step of the protocol, using
the device n times, Alice produces a bipartite state ρAB = σ⊗nAB , and chooses the measurement setting θ to measure
ρA = σ
⊗n
A with the POVM {P θx =
⊗
k P
θk
xk
: x ∈ {0, 1}n}. This measurement can be seen as a tensor product of two
binary measurements {P 00 , P 01 } and {P 10 , P 11 } because of the i.i.d. assumption. At the same time, Alice sends to Bob
a state which has i.i.d. form ρB = σ⊗nB due to our assumption. Then, the waiting time enforces the noisy-storage
model: Bob is allowed to perform any quantum operation to transform B to B′K where B′ is his quantum memory of
dimension d and K is his (unbounded) classical memory. Bob is allowed to perform any measurement on his system
B′, as advised by K and θ and his information about the state (since he prepares the devices), in order to guess
x. Note that for an honest implementation of the protocol, Alice does not need quantum memory, which makes the
protocol easy to implement.
As the security of the protocols WSE and PV are expressed in terms of cheating probability (or equivalently in
terms of min-entropy), we are here interested in the probability that Bob wins the guessing game. Indeed if this
probability is low, then it means that the probability that the two protocols PV and WSE can be cheated is low also.
The winning probability of Bob in this case is nothing but the guessing probability λ(n, d, ζ) defined as
λ(n, d, ζ) := max
ρAB′K
qqc
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx ρAB′K
 (10)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice (the possible state are
constraint by the value ζ Alice measured in the testing procedure), P θx are the measurement operators of Alice as
mentioned above and F θx the arbitrary measurement operators of Bob acting on B′K register. Note that the state
ρB′K := trA(ρAB′K) is the qc-state that Bob gets after a quantum operation on the initial state ρB = σ⊗nB sent to
him by Alice. The second maximization is a short hand for 2n separate maximizations: for each θ we pick the POVM
Fθ = {F θx : x ∈ {0, 1}n} which maximizes the sum over x. The following Lemma, whose proof is presented in the
appendix, gives a bound on this probability.
Lemma 7 (Key Lemma). In a perfect guessing game under the assumptions 1 and 5 where the adversary holds a
bounded quantum memory of dimension at most d, we have
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤
√
d
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ζ
2
)n
−
t∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2−n
(√
d
(
1 + ζ
2
)k/2
− 1
)
=: B(n, d, ζ) (11)
where t is defined as
t =
⌊
− log d ·
[
log
(
1 + ζ
2
)]−1⌋
. (12)
Observe that
B(n, d, ζ) =
√
d
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ζ
2
)n
−O(nt · 2−n) (13)
when n→∞ and d, ζ are constant, which decays exponentially in n when ζ < 1.
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2. Imperfect guessing game
The consideration of imperfect guessing game is motivated by noise in experimental realizations of any protocols.
Allowing noise between provers and verifiers in WSE or PQV allows these protocols to be implemented with current
state-of-the-art quantum technologies.
Formally, the imperfect guessing game consists of exactly the same steps as the guessing game discussed in the
previous section, except for the winning condition of Bob. Unlike the guessing game’s strict winning condition y = x,
in the imperfect guessing game Bob wins if his guess y is such that dH(x, y) ≤ γn for γ ∈ [0, 1[, where dH(·, ·) is the
Hamming distance. Formally
λip(n, d, ζ, γ) := maxρAB′K
qqc
max
{Fθ}
tr
(
2−n
∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(x,y)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θy ρAB′K
)
(14)
and γ can be understood as the maximum quantum bit error rate (QBER) allowed in the protocol. We recover the
perfect guessing game by taking γ = 0.
One of our main results in this paper is the following
Theorem 8 (Main Theorem). For an imperfect guessing game with the maximum "QBER" allowed γ ∈ [0, 1[, where
Bob holds a noisy storage device E such that E(1)C (E) ≤ log(d), the winning probability of Bob
λip(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ 2h(γ)nB(n, d, ζ) =: B′(n, d, ζ, γ) (15)
where h(·) is the binary entropy and B(n, d, ζ) is the bound defined in Lemma 7.
Proof. (sketch) We first look at the imperfect guessing game in the bounded storage model where the dimension of
B′ is bounded by d. To obtain an upper bound on λip(n, d, ζ, γ) we note that
tr
( ∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(x,y)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θy ρAB′K
)
= tr
( ∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θx⊕z ρAB′K
)
(16)
=
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
tr
( ∑
x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx⊕z ρAB′K
)
. (17)
Then combining the previous remark with (14) we have,
λip(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
max
ρAB′K
qqc
max
{Fθ}
tr
( ∑
x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx⊕z ρAB′K
)
(18)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice.
Note that all the trace terms in the sum are equivalent since z only permutes Bob’s measurement operators. Then
by using the Key Lemma 7 to bound each term of the sum over z we can write,
λip(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ B(n, d, ζ)×
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
1 (19)
= B(n, d, ζ)×
bγnc∑
k=0
(
n
i
)
(20)
To proceed further, we assume that γ < 1/2 so bγnc is bounded by bn/2c and therefore by Lemma 25 of [14] we can
bound the binomial sum by the binary entropy function h(·) so that,
λip(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2h(γ)n ·B(n, d, ζ) =: B′(n, d, ζ, γ). (21)
It remains to extend this bound to an adversary who holds a noisy memory E such that the one-shot entanglement
cost satisfies E(1)C (E) ≤ log(d). Indeed, by definition of the one-shot entanglement cost [35], the above condition means
that E can be simulated by the identity channel 1d. Then all strategies achievable with E are achievable with 1d,
particularly the strategy which maximizes the probability of winning in the bounded storage model. This proves the
Theorem.
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The bound on the winning probability of the imperfect guessing game also decays exponentially in n for suitably
chosen parameters.
Lemma 9. If the maximum QBER allowed γ satisfies the following conditions
γ ≤ 1/2 (22)
h(γ) < − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + ζ
2
)
(23)
then B′(n, d, ζ, γ) decays exponentially in n, when n→∞ and d, ζ are fixed.
Note that it is always possible to have a γ which satisfies these conditions since the right hand sides of the inequalities
are strictly positive.
Proof. First note that B′(n, d, ζ, γ) = 2h(γ)nB(n, d, ζ). According to Lemma 7, B(n, d, ζ) =
√
d
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1+ζ
2
)n
−
O(nt · 2−n) It is now straightforward to see that the condition on γ implies the exponential decay of B′(n, d, ζ, γ).
III. APPLICATIONS
The bound on the winning probability of the guessing game can be applied to prove the security of several two-party
cryptographic protocols. Here we will apply it to prove the security of Weak String Erasure and Position Verification.
For the first protocol, we can directly consider an attack on WSE as an attack on the guessing game. For the second
protocol, as the security of PV can be reduced to the security of WSE [6], we also get a security proof for PV.
A. Device-Independent Weak String Erasure
1. (α,ε=0)-WSE in the noisy storage model
Let the two protagonists of (α, )-WSE be Alice and Bob. The goal of this cryptographic primitive is that at the
end of its execution Alice holds a random bit string x and Bob holds a random substring of x called xI . We can view
this xI as x where we have randomly erased some bits, hence the name WSE (Protocol 10). For a formal definition
of (α, )-WSE we refer to [15].
Protocol 10 (Weak String Erasure). In the case where Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol is executed as follows:
1. Alice tests her devices following the testing protocol 2 and obtains ζ, an estimate of an upper bound on the
absolute effective anti-commutator.
2. Alice creates n identical bipartite states. She chooses uniformly at random a string θ ∈ {0, 1}n and measures
her part of the kth register by inputting it and θk to her measurement device to get an outcome xk. This process
generates an outcome string x ∈ {0, 1}n. At the same time she sends all the B registers to Bob.
3. Bob chooses uniformly at random θ′ ∈ {0, 1}n, and measures his registers in the same manner as Alice to get
an outcome string x′ ∈ {0, 1}n.
4. Alice waits for a duration ∆t before sending θ to Bob.
5. Bob determines the index set I := {k ∈ [n] : θ′k = θk}, and obtains the corresponding substring x′I .
At the end of the protocol Alice holds x and Bob holds (I, x′I). It can be easily checked that in the ideal imple-
mentation, x′I is a substring of x so Bob does not know the full x and Alice does not know I. WSE is secure for an
honest Bob if Alice cannot get the set I, and for an honest Alice if it is hard for Bob to guess the entire string x.
The probability that Bob guesses x, and so that he wins the game, is defined as
λWSE(n, d, ζ) := max
ρABK
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx ρABK
 (24)
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where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice. Saying that x is hard to
guess means that this probability decays exponentially with n or equivalently
∃α > 0 : Hmin(X|BKΘ)/n ≥ α.
If Bob is dishonest, we can look at any attack strategy of Bob as a guessing strategy in the guessing game where
Bob has to guess Alice’s bit string x. Thus we have the following:
Corollary 11. For (α,  = 0)-WSE in the noisy storage model, under the assumption 1, if Alice’s memoryless device is
such that ζ < 1 then the cheating probability λWSE(n, d, ζ) of Bob is upper bounded by B′(n, d, ζ, γ), where B′(n, d, ζ, γ)
is defined in Theorem 8.
Proof. We can directly apply Theorem 8 on (α,  = 0)-WSE by considering Bob’s cheating strategy as a guessing
game.
2. (α,ε=0)-WSE in noisy entanglement model
In order to make the link between WSE and PV, we describe briefly WSE in the noisy entanglement model (see [6]
for more details). The protocol is the same as before but now there are two Bobs, called Bob1 and Bob2, who share
an entangled state ρB1B2 such that E
(1)
C (ρB1B2) ≤ log(d) (which replaces Bob’s channel E used in the noisy storage
model), and can only communicate classically from Bob1 to Bob2. It is Bob2 who is asked to get the pair (I, xI),
while Alice sends ρB to Bob1 and θ to Bob2. If the Bobs are cheaters, Bob1 will try to send ρB to Bob2 using their
entanglement and classical communication, in order to enable Bob2 to guess the full outcome string x ∈ {0, 1}n of
Alice in the perfect case (or at least (1− γ)n bits in the imperfect case).
The Bobs play the role of the malicious provers in PV, called M1 and M2 who both want to guess x. The fact
that in PV they both have to guess x to be able to cheat the protocol makes PV harder to cheat than WSE in the
noisy-entangled model where only one Bob (Bob2) needs to guess x. Because it is harder to cheat in PV, proving the
security on this model of WSE proves the result for PV [6]. Again we say that WSE in the noisy-entangled model is
secure if the cheating probability denoted by λNE decays exponentially with n. In the two following Lemmas we first
prove the security of WSE for the bounded-entanglement model, and then extend it to noisy-entanglement model.
Definition 12. For (α,  = 0)-WSE in the bounded-entanglement model, the probability λBE(n, d, ζ) that Bob2 per-
fectly guesses Alice’s output string x ∈ {0, 1}n is,
λBE(n, d, ζ) := max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx ρAB2K
 (25)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice (which are constraint by the
value ζ measured in the testing procedure). Here the state ρB2 is of dimension at most d.
In the following Lemma 13 we look at the special case where ρB1B2 is a maximally entangled state of local dimension
d (this case is WSE in the bounded entanglement model). This Lemma is a variant of Lemma 7.
Lemma 13. For WSE in the bounded-entanglement model, where the two Bobs share a perfect entangled state ρB1B2
of dimension at most d2, the probability λBE(n, d, ζ) that Bob2 perfectly guesses Alice’s output string x ∈ {0, 1}n is
λBE(n, d, ζ) ≤ B(n, d, ζ) (26)
where B(n, d, ζ) is defined in Lemma 7.
Proof. The guessing probability of Bob2 in this model is given by
λBE(n, d, ζ) := max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx ρAB2K
 (27)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice. Note that this is the same
expression as λ(n, d, ζ) except that the state ρAB′K is replaced by ρAB2K . We can then invoke Lemma 7 since Bob2’s
measurements are also acting jointly on d-dimensional quantum register B2 and an arbitrary large classical register
K.
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We now want to extend the result to the case where the adversary holds noisy entanglement and must guess Alice’s
string up to some error tolerance γ.
Definition 14. For (α,  = 0)-WSE in the noisy-entanglement model, the probability λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) that Bob2 guesses
Alice’s output string x ∈ {0, 1}n with an error rate, as defined in the paragraph before equation (14), at most γ is,
λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) := max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(x,y)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θy ρAB2K
 (28)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice. Here we assume that the
state shared by the two Bobs ρB1B2 is such that E
(1)
C (ρB1B2) ≤ log(d).
Now we tackle the general case where ρB1B2 is a noisy-entangled state such that E
(1)
C (ρB1B2) ≤ log(d).
Lemma 15. Consider (α,  = 0)-WSE in the noisy-entanglement model, where the two Bobs share a noisy entangled
state ρB1B2 such that E
(1)
C (ρB1B2) ≤ log(d). If Alice’s device is such that ζ < 1, then the probability λNE(n, d, ζ) that
Bob2 produces a guess y ∈ {0, 1}n and dH(x, y) ≤ γn with x ∈ {0, 1}n being Alice’s output string, is upper bounded
as follows
λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ B′(n, d, ζ, γ) (29)
where B′(n, d, ζ, γ) is defined in Theorem 8.
Proof. We first look at the imperfect guessing game in the bounded entanglement model, where Bob1 and Bob2 share
a maximally entangled state of dimension M ≤ d:∣∣∣ΨB1B2M 〉 := 1√
M
M∑
i=1
∣∣iB1〉 ∣∣iB2〉 (30)
Denote ΨM :=
∣∣∣ΨB1B2M 〉〈ΨB1B2M ∣∣∣. Note that the fact that the local dimension ΨM is at most d implies that Bob2’s
quantum state ρB2 has a dimension bounded by d. Hence it is easy to see that
λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) := max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(x,y)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θy ρAB2K
 (31)
≤ max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
P θx ⊗ F θx⊕z ρAB2K
 (32)
≤
∑
z∈{0,1}n
wH(z)≤γn
max
ρAB2K
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx⊕z ρAB2K
 (33)
where the first maximization is over all qqc-states compatible with the marginal on Alice, can be bounded by the
techniques in the proof of the Theorem 8 since the register B2 has bounded dimension. We have
λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ 2h(γ)n ×B(n, d, ζ) ≤ B′(n, d, ζ, γ). (34)
We can extend this bound against an adversary who holds a noisy entangled state ρB1B2 such that E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρB1B2) ≤
log(d). Indeed by definition (eq. (4)) of the one shot entanglement cost of the state ρB1B2 denoted E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρB1B2)
[36], saying that E(1)C,LOCC(ρB1B2) ≤ log(d) means that ρB1B2 can be created from a perfectly entangled state ΨM of
dimensionM ≤ d. Thus, all strategies achievable with ρB1B2 are achievable with ΨM . In particular the strategy which
maximizes the probability of winning with respect to ρB1B2 is achievable with ΨM which proves the Lemma.
If γ in the protocol is such that it satisfies the condition of Lemma 9, the previous bound proves the security of
(α,  = 0)-WSE since it decays exponentially.
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B. Device-Independent Position Verification
In the following we will prove that PV in the noisy entanglement model (NE) is device-independently secure. Indeed
the attacks on PV in the NE model can be mapped to attacks on WSE in the NE model [6, Theorem 14]. As we have
proved in Lemma 15 that WSE in the NE model is device-independently secure, PV in the NE model must be secure.
Here we only speak about the one dimensional position verification protocol. In PV there are three protagonists in
the honest case: two verifiers (V1 and V2) and one prover (P ). The prover claims to be at some geographical position,
and the PV protocol permits to check whether this is true.
Protocol 16 (Position Verification). Let us assume P has claimed his position to be in the middle of both verifiers
(fig. 1). The verifiers check this claim by the following procedure:
1. V1 tests his devices as described in the testing protocol 2
2. At the beginning of the protocol, the two verifiers V1 and V2 share a random bit string θ ∈ {0, 1}n.
3. V1 prepares a bipartite state (which is ideally a maximally entangled state) ρV1P = σ
⊗n
V1P
which has a tensor
product structure, and sends the part ρP := trV1(ρV1P ) to the prover.
V2 sends the string θ to the prover, such that the prover receives θ and ρP at the same time.
V1 applies the measurementMθ = {P θy :=
⊗
j∈[n] P
θj
yj , y ∈ {0, 1}n} to his part of the state ρV1P and gets x.
4. The prover applies a projective measurement Mθ, and gets a bit string y ∈ {0, 1}n. Then he sends y to both
verifiers.
5. Then V1 compares (using the Hamming distance) his outcome x with the string y he receives from the prover,
and measures how much time passed between the moment he sent the state to P and the moment he receives y
from P .
6. V1 sends x to V2 so V2 can also compare y and x. V2 also measures how long it took for the message to come
back.
7. If x = y (or dH(x, y) ≤ γn) and the time measured by the verifiers is lower than a certain fixed bound ∆t then
the prover passes the protocol, which means that the verifiers accept that the prover is at his claimed position.
As mentioned in the introduction, if the prover is dishonest, it suffices to consider the scenario where there are
two dishonest provers B1 and B2 who impersonate being at some claimed location. The protocol is secure against
adversaries holding an entangled state ρB1B2 with one shot entanglement cost bounded by d if the probability that
the adversaries cheat the protocol decays exponentially with the length n of x (which is also the number of quantum
system the verifiers send to the prover).
Definition 17. In the general case when the winning condition on the prover’s guess y is dH(x, y) ≤ γn, where x is
the verifiers’ bit string and γ ∈ [0, 1[ is the maximal QBER, the probability of cheating in PV is defined as
λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) := max
ρV1M1M2
max
{T θ}
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
dH(x,y)≤γn
P θx ⊗ T θy ⊗ F θy ρV1M1M2

where the first maximization is over all states compatible with the marginal on V1, P θx , T θx and F θx are the measurement
operators for V1, M1 and M2 respectively, and where the second and the third maximisations are short hand for 2n
separate maximisations: for each θ, M1 and M2 choose the POVMs which maximize λPV(n, d, ζ, γ)
Definition 18. PV is said to be α-secure if there exists α > 0 and an integer N ≥ 1 such that ∀n ≥ N the probability
λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) that dishonest provers pass the protocol is such that:
λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ 2−αn. (35)
Note that the value of α may depend on d, ζ and γ.
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In our case we limit the attack scheme by assuming that the adversaries can only share a limited amount of
entanglement (assumptions 5) and that they do not use quantum communication, but they have access to perfect and
unlimited classical communication. Moreover we will assume that the device-independent assumption 1 is satisfied in
our model of attack.
Lemma 19. In PV in the Noisy Entanglement model, where Bob1 and Bob2 share a state ρB1B2 such that
E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρB1B2) ≤ log(d), if V1’s device is such that ζ < 1 then the probability λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) that Bob2 guesses
a string y ∈ {0, 1}n and dH(x, y) ≤ γn, where x is V1’s outcome measurement, is upper bounded by
λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ B′(n, d, ζ, γ) (36)
where B′(n, d, ζ, γ) is defined in Theorem 8.
Proof. We use the proof in [6, Theorem 14], which reduces the security of PV under the assumption that there is no
quantum communication between cheaters, to the security of Weak String Erasure in the noisy entanglement model,
in other words it proves that λPV(n, d, ζ, γ) ≤ λNE(n, d, ζ, γ) and then using Lemma 15 we conclude the proof.
If γ is such that it satisfies the condition of Lemma 9 this bound proves the security of PV since B′(n, d, ζ, γ) decays
exponentially (see figure 4). The security proof is independent of the implementation of the protocol. Moreover, to
allow an honest prover to pass the protocol even when there is some noise in the quantum channel between V1 and
P or if honest prover’s measurements are not perfect means that we allow the prover P to guess the string x with
some error quantified by the Hamming distance. This choice obviously makes the protocol easier to cheat on when
P is dishonest, but according to Lemmas 19 and 9 the protocol is still secure if the fraction of errors γ allowed in the
guessed string is small enough.
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Figure 4. QBER γ allowed in function of the CHSH violation S obtained in the testing procedure when n → ∞ and d finite.
The blue region is the secure region i.e. the region where the bound B′(n, d, ζ, γ) decays exponentially in n for a fixed d.
Note that PV is still secure if we allow V1’s device to send the string x to the prover after V1 makes the measurements
on his state. V1 just has to wait long enough before measuring his state. Then dishonest provers cannot use this
information since there is a time constraint on their answers.
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IV. CONCLUSION
By proving that the probability of winning an imperfect guessing game decays exponentially with the length of
the string which has to be guessed, we prove the security of Weak String Erasure and Position Verification even
when the devices used to create or measure states are not trusted, i.e. in the device-independent scenario. This
implies the device-independent security of any two-party cryptography protocols that can be made from WSE and
classical communications, and certain position-based cryptographic tasks. Unfortunately, our proofs are not fully
device-independent since we still assume that the honest party’s devices (Alice’s or V1’s ones) are memoryless (the
i.i.d. assumption). Nevertheless, this is an improvement over previous known results, since until now bounds made
under the memoryless devices were proportional to the dimension of the memory held by the adversary, whereas our
bounds are proportional to the square root of this dimension. The improvement was made thanks to the development
of new techniques, which directly deal with the adversary’s quantum memory.
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Appendix A: Technical Lemma
In the proof of the Key Lemma to be presented below, we will need the following result. Similar results about norm
of sums of operators have been obtained by Kittaneh [37], see also [5, Lemma 2].
Lemma 20. If A1, A2, . . . , AN are positive semidefinite operators, then∥∥∥∥∑
i∈[N ]
Ai
∥∥∥∥ ≤ maxj∈[N ] ∑
i∈[N ]
∥∥∥√Ai√Aj∥∥∥ , (A1)
where [N ] := {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. Let K be an N × N block matrix with entries Kij =
√
Ai
√
Aj and L is an N × N matrix of entries Lij =
‖√Ai
√
Aj‖, we first show that ∥∥∥∥∑
i∈[N ]
Ai
∥∥∥∥ = ‖K‖ ≤ ‖L‖ . (A2)
Defining K˜ :=
∑
j |j〉 ⊗
√
Aj , a direct calculation reveals
K˜†K˜ =
∑
j
Aj and K˜K˜† =
∑
jk
|j〉〈k | ⊗√Aj√Ak = K , (A3)
from which follows the first equality since the operator norm satisfies ‖K˜†K˜‖ = ‖K˜K˜†‖. We are thus left with proving
‖K˜K˜†‖ ≤ ‖L‖ where now we rewrite L in the following form
L =
∑
jk
|j〉〈k | ⊗ ‖√Aj√Ak‖ . (A4)
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Since the operator norm of a positive semidefinite matrix corresponds to its largest eigenvalue, it suffices to prove that
the largest eigenvalue of K˜K˜† is not greater than the largest eigenvalue of L. Let |α〉 be an eigenvector corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue of K˜K˜† and write it as
|α〉 =
∑
j
αj |j〉|ej〉, (A5)
where αj are real and positive and |ej〉 are arbitrary but normalised. Then
‖K˜K˜†‖ = 〈α|K˜K˜†|α〉 =
∑
jk
αjαk〈ej |
√
Aj
√
Ak|ek〉. (A6)
Now it suffices to prove that this can be upper bounded by 〈α′ |L|α′〉 for
|α′〉 =
∑
j
αj |j〉, (A7)
which implies
‖K‖ = ‖K˜K˜†‖ = 〈α|K˜K˜†|α〉 ≤ 〈α′ |L|α′〉 ≤ ‖L‖. (A8)
To show 〈α|K|α〉 ≤ 〈α′ |L|α′〉, we begin by rewriting K as
K =
∑
jk
|j〉〈k | ⊗√Aj√Ak (A9)
=
∑
j<k
|j〉〈k | ⊗√Aj√Ak + |k〉〈j | ⊗√Ak√Aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Bjk
+
∑
j
|j〉〈j | ⊗Aj (A10)
This form makes hermitian matrices Bjk and |j〉〈j |⊗Aj appear in the sums. K is positive semidefinite so 〈α|K|α〉 =
|〈α|K|α〉| and,
|〈α|K|α〉| = |
∑
j 6=k
αjαk〈j |〈ej |Bjk|k〉|ek〉+
∑
j
α2j 〈ej |Aj |ej〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤‖Aj‖
| (A11)
≤
∑
j 6=k
αjαk|〈j |〈ej |Bjk|k〉|ek〉|+
∑
j
α2j‖Aj‖. (A12)
Now by decomposing the vectors |j〉|ej〉 =
∑
l β
j
l |βl〉 and |k〉|ek〉 =
∑
m β
k
m|βm〉 in an eigenbasis of Bjk noted {|βi〉}i
we get,
|〈j |〈ej |Bjk|k〉|ek〉| = |
∑
lm
βj∗l β
k
m〈βl |Bjk|βm〉| (A13)
= |
∑
l
βj∗l β
k
l λl| (A14)
where {λl}l are the eigenvalues of Bjk. Using the triangle inequality we have,
|
∑
l
βj∗l β
k
l λl| ≤
∑
l
|βj∗l ||βkl ||λl| (A15)
≤ max
i
|λi|
∑
l
|βj∗l ||βkl |︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
(A16)
≤ max
i
|λi| = ‖Bjk‖. (A17)
It is easy to check that ‖Bjk‖ = ‖
√
Aj
√
Ak‖. Using that and (A17) in the inequality (A12) we have,
‖K‖ = 〈α|K|α〉 ≤
∑
jk
αjαk‖
√
Aj
√
Ak‖ = 〈α′ |L|α′〉 ≤ ‖L‖ (A18)
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which gives the desired inequality ‖K‖ ≤ ‖L‖.
Using Hölder’s inequality (Lyapunov’s inequalities) for induced p-norms, we have
‖L‖ = ‖L‖I2 ≤
(‖L‖I1 · ‖L‖I∞)1/2 , (A19)
where the norms on the right hand side are equal to the maximum absolute row or column sums
‖L‖I1 = max
j
∑
i
‖
√
Ai
√
Aj‖, (A20)
‖L‖I∞ = max
i
∑
j
‖
√
Ai
√
Aj‖. (A21)
The Lemma follows since these two norms are equal for hermitian matrices.
Appendix B: Proof of the Key Lemma
The main content of this appendix is a detailed proof of the Key Lemma presented in the main text. Specifically,
we prove a bound on the probability that Bob wins the game, only depending on a quantity ζ that Alice can estimate
experimentally, Bob’s memory size d, and n which is the number of rounds played in the game.
We split this proof into four steps. In Step 1 we analyse how Jordan’s Lemma permits us to conveniently express the
effective absolute anti-commutator of Alice’s measurements. In Step 2 we derive a bound on the winning probability
expressed in terms of what we call "operator overlap", then in Step 3 we bound this overlap by a simpler expression
depending on the effective anti-commutator. We finish the proof in Step 4 by replacing, in the previous simple bound
on the overlap, the effective anti-commutator by a quantity that Alice can estimate experimentally.
For the reader’s convenience, we have included Table II which explains the symbols used in the proof.
Step 1: Alice’s i.i.d. state-preparation and measurement device
In this section we use Jordan’s Lemma to rewrite Alice’s measurement operators and the absolute effective anti-
commutator.
We assume that the devices used by Alice to prepare and measure satisfy the i.i.d. assumption, i.e. the state produced
in n rounds is of the form ρAB = σ⊗nAB and the measurement corresponding to input θ ∈ {0, 1}n can be written as{P θx =
⊗
k P
θk
xk
: x ∈ {0, 1}n}, where {P 00 , P 01 } and {P 10 , P 11 } are some unknown (but fixed) binary measurements. It
is worth stressing that this implies that the reduced state on Alice is of product form, ρA = σ⊗nA , regardless of how
Bob manipulates his subsystem. We make no assumptions on the dimensions of the system (except that they are
finite dimensional).
By Naimark’s dilation Theorem we can without loss of generality assume that the measurements {P 00 , P 01 } and
{P 10 , P 11 } are projective, which allows us to apply Jordan’s Lemma [33, 34]. The projectors representing the first
outcome P 00 and P 10 can be simultaneously decomposed into orthogonal projections of rank at most one, projecting on
either one or two dimensional subspaces invariant under the action of both projectors (a subspaceW is invariant under
the linear opearator T if and only if TW ⊆ W ). Moreover we only get two-dimensional blocks when the projectors
have non-trivial overlap, i.e. they are neither orthogonal nor identical:
P 00 =
∑
j∈J
P 00|j , P
1
0 =
∑
j∈J
P 10|j , (B1)
where P a0|j (a ∈ {0, 1}) are such that ∀j, j′ P a0|jP a0|j′ = δjj′P a0|j and are acting on a subspace of dimension one or two.
Then we have,
P 01 =
∑
j∈J
(Sj − P 00|j), P 11 =
∑
j∈J
(Sj − P 10|j). (B2)
where Sj is a projection which projects on the subspace where P a0|j and P
a
1|j act. Note that the number of non-zero
summands in (B1) is equal to the rank of P 00 or P 10 respectively.
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A convenient basis of the Hilbert space can be chosen as follows. Each index j ∈ J corresponds to either a one
or two dimensional subspace. For the two dimensional subspaces indexed by j in J where both P 00|j and P 10|j are
nonzero, we pick the orthonormal eigenbasis of P 00|j , namely |00|j〉 and |10|j〉, as the basis for these subspaces
P 00|j |00|j〉 = |00|j〉, P 00|j |10|j〉 = 0. (B3)
Moreover, one can pick these basis vectors (by including a phase factor if necessary) such that the eigenstates |01|j〉
and |11|j〉 of P 10|j , which satisfy
P 10|j |01|j〉 = |01|j〉, P 10|j |11|j〉 = 0, (B4)
are related to those of P 00|j by
|01|j〉 = cosβj |00|j〉+ sinβj |10|j〉, |11|j〉 = sinβj |00|j〉 − cosβj |10|j〉, (B5)
for some angle βj ∈ [0, pi/2]. For the one dimensional subspaces (also indexed by j ∈ J ) we define |00|j〉 being a unit
vector, and |10|j〉 is the null vector. Then we define |01|j〉 and |11|j〉 as previously but with βj = 0 or βj = pi/2. In
summary, since we have defined a basis for each j ∈ J , taking the direct sum gives a basis for the whole Hilbert space.
Any binary (projective) measurement device admits a characterization through the angles βj ∈ [0, pi/2] for j ∈ J and
this characterization turns out to be sufficient for our purposes.
The previous block decomposition allows us to conveniently compute the effective absolute anticommutator defined
as + := 12 tr(|{A0, A1}|σA) where Aθ := P θ0 − P θ1 for θ ∈ {0, 1}. The word "effective" means that + depends not
only on Alice’s measurements, but also on the state on which the measurements act. Under Jordan’s Lemma, the
absolute anticommutator becomes
|{A0, A1}| = |
∑
j
{A0|j , A1|j}| =
∑
j
2| cos(2βj)|Sj (B6)
with Aθ|j := P
θ
0|j − P θ1|j and Sj being the orthogonal projections defined above, where the absolute anticommutator
of a two dimensional block j is computed using (B5) and that of a one dimensional block follows from our definition
of βj = 0 in Step 1. Let pj := tr(SjσA) be the probability of σA being projected in the j-th block, then, the absolute
effective commutator can be written as
+ =
∑
j
pj | cos(2βj)| =
∑
j
pjj , (B7)
where j := | cos(2βj)| is the absolute effective anticommutator of the block j. It is worth pointing out that for
qubit observables there is no notion of "effectiveness", i.e. the incompatibility is fixed by the observables and does not
depend on the state.
Also, the previous decomposition of Alice measurements enables the n run projectors to be block diagonalized as
P θx =
n⊗
k=1
P θkxk =
n⊗
k=1
∑
bk∈J
P θkxk|bk =
∑
b∈Jn
P θx|b, (B8)
where P θx|b :=
⊗n
k=1 P
θk
xk|bk , and J is the set of indices which label blocks and J n := J×n. We denote the set of
projectors associated with this direct sum decomposition by {Sb}b∈Jn , where Sb :=
⊗n
k=1 Sbk . For each k, we have
P θkxk|bkP
θk
x′k|b′k = δxk,x
′
k
δbk,b′kP
θk
xk|bk , and P
θk
xk|bk orthogonal to P
θ′k
x′k|b′k whenever bk 6= b
′
k. The analysis of the guessing
game will rest on these orthogonality relations and the set of angles βj defined above.
Step 2: From guessing probability to "operator overlaps"
The goal of this section is to bound Bob’s wining probability in term of the overlap
∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥. To be precise
we show that,
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Variable Range Meaning
n N total number of (measurement) runs
k [n] index of the run (subscript) or
the classical information of Bob (superscript)
θ {0, 1}n measurement string
θk {0, 1} kth measurement
x {0, 1}n output string
xk {0, 1} kth output
j J index of Jordan’s Lemma decomposition
b J n vector indexing block combination
bk J kth element of b
p(·) [0,1] probability of (·) (depending on context)
βbk [0, pi/2] angle of Alice’s binary measurement in block bk
bk [0,1] absolute effective anticommutator in block bk
Table II. Table of symbols.
Lemma 21. Bob’s wining probability λ(n, d, ζ) defined in equation (10) is bounded as follow:
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k,b
pkpb|k max
θ′
2−n
∑
θ
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥ (B9)
Proof. Since we assume that the quantum memory of Bob is bounded he cannot store the entire register B received
from Alice. More specifically, according to the bounded storage model he must immediately input the register B into
an encoding map which outputs a quantum register B′ (whose dimension is bounded by d) and a classical register
K (of arbitrary size). The joint state between Alice and Bob is then a qqc-state ρAB′K =
∑
k pkρ
k
AB′ ⊗ |k〉〈k| whose
marginal remains i.i.d. ρA = trB′K(ρAB′K) = σ⊗nA . Once Alice has measured her part of the system, Bob is told the
choice of her measurements represented by θ ∈ {0, 1}n and is asked to guess the string of outcomes. We take the
success probability given by (10) and expand the classical register K to obtain
λ(n, d, ζ) = max
ρAB′K
qqc
max
{Fθ}
tr
2−n ∑
θ,x∈{0,1}n
P θx ⊗ F θx ρAB′K
 (B10)
= max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ}
∑
k
pk tr
∑
θ,x
2−nP θx ⊗ F θxρkAB′ ⊗ |k〉〈k |K
 (B11)
= max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k
pk tr
∑
θ,x
2−nP θx ⊗ F θ,kx ρkAB′
 , (B12)
where P θx are the measurement operators on Alice’s side, and
F θ,kx := trK(F
θ
x1B′ ⊗ |k〉〈k |K) (B13)
are d-dimensional measurement operators on Bob’s side acting on B′, which depend both on his classical memory
k and the basis string θ received from Alice. The outer optimization is constrained to ensembles which yield the
correct marginal on Alice’s side, i.e. trB′(
∑
k pkρ
k
AB′) = σ
⊗n
A . The inner maximization represents |Θ||K| independent
maximizations each of which is over a POVM {F θ,kx }. The rest of the proof will be concerned with upper bounding
λ(n, d, ζ).
Inserting (B8) into (B12) we get
λ(n, d, ζ) = max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k
pk tr
∑
θ,x
2−n
∑
b
P θx|b ⊗ F θxρkAB′
 , (B14)
Recall that Sb represents the projection operator into the blocks indexed by b ∈ J n . Define ρkAbB′ := (Sb ⊗
1B′)ρ
k
AB′(Sb ⊗ 1B′)/pb|k to be the normalized projections of ρkAbB′ into these various blocks with pb|k := tr
(
(Sb ⊗
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1B′)ρ
k
AB′
)
. Then
λ(n, d, ζ) = max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k
pk
∑
b
pb|k tr
∑
θ,x
2−nP θx|b ⊗ F θ,kx ρkAbB′
 , (B15)
and for convenience let us denote Πθ,kb :=
∑
x P
θ
x|b ⊗ F θ,kx so that
λ(n, d, ζ) = max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k,b
pkpb|k tr
(∑
θ
2−nΠθ,kb ρ
k
AbB′
)
. (B16)
Bounding each of the trace terms by its operator norm yields
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k,b
pkpb|k
∥∥∥∥∥∑
θ
2−nΠθ,kb
∥∥∥∥∥ . (B17)
For each b, k the corresponding operator norm can be bounded using Lemma 20 as follows∥∥∥∥∥∑
θ
2−nΠθ,kb
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2−n maxθ′ ∑
θ
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥ (B18)
from which (B17) becomes
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2−n max
{pk,ρkAB′}
max
{Fθ,k}
∑
k,b
pkpb|k max
θ′
∑
θ
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Λ
. (B19)
Step 3: Bound on operator overlaps
The goal of this section is to find a bound on
∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥ which holds independenly of k. The superscript k of
the operator Πθ
′,k
b reminds us that Bob’s measurement might depend on his classical information. Here, we derive a
bound which only depends on the dimension of his quantum system i.e. independent of k. Therefore, we will from now
omit the superscript k which represented the classical information of Bob. The following Lemma is the key towards
the main result.
Lemma 22. For all θ′, θ ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ J n, we have∥∥∥∥√Πθ′b √Πθb∥∥∥∥ ≤ min
{
1,
√
d
n∏
k=1
(max{cosβbk , sinβbk})wk
}
, (B20)
where d is the dimension of Bob’s quantum memory, and w := θ′ ⊕ θ ∈ {0, 1}n
Proof. Let us begin by simplifying
√
Πθ
′
b
√
Πθb using the definition of Π
θ
b in Step 2 and orthogonality relations of P
θ
x|b
in Step 1. Let S = {k ∈ [n] : θ′k = θk} and T = {k ∈ [n] : θ′k 6= θk} be the indices where the measurement choices
agree and differ respectively. Then,√
Πθ
′
b
√
Πθb =
∑
x,y
P θ
′
x|bP
θ
y|b ⊗
√
F θ′x
√
F θy (B21)
=
∑
x,y
⊗
k∈S
P
θ′k
xk|bkP
θk
yk|bk
⊗
k∈T
P
θ′k
xk|bkP
θk
yk|bk ⊗
√
F θ′x
√
F θy (B22)
=
∑
x,y
⊗
k∈S
δxk,ykP
θk
yk|bk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
⊗
k∈T
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈xθ′kk|bk ∣∣∣yθkk|bk〉〈yθkk|bk ∣∣∣⊗√F θ′x √F θy (B23)
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where
∣∣∣yθkk|bk〉 are the eigenvectors defined in Step 1. The notation ∣∣∣yθkk|bk〉 should be read as the eigenvector representing
the outcome yk ∈ {0, 1} of the measurement θk ∈ {0, 1} restricted to the block bk ∈ J .
The sum over x = (x1, ..., xn), y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ {0, 1}n can be split into a sum of variables with indices in S which
we will denote by x˜, y˜ and indices in T denoted x′, y′. The definition of S implies that x˜ = y˜. Let
Mx˜ :=
∑
x′,y′∈{0,1}|T |
⊗
k∈T
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈xθ′kk|bk ∣∣∣yθkk|bk〉〈yθkk|bk ∣∣∣⊗√F θ′x˜x′√F θx˜y′ , (B24)
where the two strings x′ and x together form a bit string of length n and give meaning to the notation F θ
′
x˜x′ (same for
F θx˜y′). Since the register labelled as (?) consists of orthogonal projectors, the desired operator norm is achieved by a
maximization over x˜ ∈ {0, 1}|S|. That is ∥∥∥∥√Πθ′b √Πθb∥∥∥∥ = max
x˜∈{0,1}|S|
‖Mx˜‖ (B25)
In the following we derive an upper bound which does not depend on x˜. Since for k ∈ T we have θk 6= θ′k, we use
Eq. (B5) to evaluate the inner product〈
x
θ′k
k|bk
∣∣∣yθkk|bk〉 = (−1)xkyk cos(βbk)xk⊕yk sin(βbk)xk⊕yk , (B26)
where xk ⊕ yk = 1− xk ⊕ yk. Therefore,
Mx˜ =
∑
x′,y′
(−1)x′·y¯′
⊗
k∈T
cos(βbk)
xk⊕yk sin(βbk)
xk⊕yk
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈yθkk|bk ∣∣∣⊗√F θ′x˜x′√F θx˜y′ . (B27)
where ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}m, x.y := ∑k xkyk
From ‖Mx˜‖ =
√
‖Mx˜M†x˜‖ and the definition
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′) := (−1)(x′⊕z′)·y¯
∏
k∈T
cos(βbk)
xk⊕yk+zk⊕yk sin(βbk)
xk⊕yk+zk⊕yk , (B28)
where βb is a vector of angles, we simplify Mx˜M
†
x˜ and get
‖Mx˜‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x′,z′
⊗
k∈T
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈zθ′kk|bk ∣∣∣⊗√F θ′x˜x′
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
√F θ′x˜z′︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
. (B29)
Bounding the register labelled as (∗∗) by its operator norm does not decrease the norm as mentioned in Lemma 20.
Hence we have
‖Mx˜‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x′,z′
⊗
k∈T
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈zθ′kk|bk ∣∣∣ · ∥∥∥√F θ′x˜x′
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
√F θ′x˜z′∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
. (B30)
Bounding the outer operator norm with Schatten two norm (‖ · ‖ ≤ ‖ · ‖2) gives
‖Mx˜‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x′,z′
⊗
k∈T
∣∣∣xθ′kk|bk〉〈zθ′kk|bk ∣∣∣ · ∥∥∥√F θ′x˜x′
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
√F θ′x˜z′∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1/2
2
(B31)
=
∑
x′,z′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
√
F θ
′
x˜x′
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
√F θ′x˜z′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2

1/4
. (B32)
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Using submultiplicativity of the operator norm we have
‖Mx˜‖ ≤
∑
x′,z′
∥∥∥∥√F θ′x˜x′∥∥∥∥2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2 ∥∥∥∥√F θ′x˜z′∥∥∥∥2

1/4
(B33)
=

∑
x′,z′
∥∥∥F θ′x˜x′∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
y′
f(βb, x
′, y′, z′)F θx˜y′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
∥∥∥F θ′x˜z′∥∥∥

1/4
. (B34)
From the definition of f(βb, x′, y′, z′) in (B28) it is easy to see that
|f(βb, x, y, z)| ≤
∏
k∈T
max{cos2 βbk , sin2 βbk}. (B35)
Since this bound does not depend on y′ we can take it out of the sum
(∗) ≤
∏
k∈T
max{cos4 βbk , sin4 βbk}
∥∥∥∥∥∑
y
F θx˜y′
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(B36)
≤
∏
k∈T
max{cos4 βbk , sin4 βbk}. (B37)
The latter inequality holds because
∑
y F
θ
x˜y ≤ 1. Using this bound in (B34) gives us,∥∥∥∥√Πθ′b √Πθb∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∏
k∈T
max{cosβbk , sinβbk}
[∑
x′z′
‖F θ′x˜x′‖‖F θ
′
x˜z′‖
]1/4
(B38)
=
∏
k∈T
max{cosβbk , sinβbk}
[∑
x
‖F θ′x˜x′‖
]1/2
(B39)
≤
√
d
∏
k∈T
max{cosβbk , sinβbk} (B40)
where in the last inequality we use the observation that for all x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n−t
∑
x′
‖F θ′x˜x′‖ ≤
∑
x
tr(F θ
′
x˜x′) = tr
(∑
x
F θ
′
x˜x′
)
≤ tr(1d) = d (B41)
since Bob’s quantum memory is of dimension at most d. Combining this bound with the trivial bound
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′b √Πθb∥∥∥∥ ≤
1 completes the proof.
Lemma 23. For all θ′, θ ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ J n, we have∥∥∥∥√Πθ′b √Πθb∥∥∥∥ ≤ min
{
1,
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + bk
2
)wk/2}
, (B42)
where d is the dimension of Bob’s memory and w := θ ⊕ θ′ ∈ {0, 1}n
Proof. Recall that for all k ∈ [n] and b ∈ J n
bk := | cos 2βbk | =
{
cos 2βbk if βbk ∈ [0, pi/4]
− cos 2βbk if βbk ∈]pi/4, pi/2]
(B43)
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• If βbk ∈ [0, pi/4] then cosβbk ≥ sinβbk and
max{cosβbk , sinβbk} = cosβbk =
√
1 + cos 2βbk
2
=
√
1 + bk
2
. (B44)
• Similarly, if βbk ∈]pi/4, pi/2] then sinβbk ≥ cosβbk and
max{cosβbk , sinβbk} = sinβbk =
√
1− cos 2βbk
2
=
√
1 + bk
2
. (B45)
Plugging
max{cosβbk , sinβbk} =
√
1 + bk
2
, (B46)
into Lemma 22 completes the proof.
Step 4: Completing the proof
In this section we first we bound Bob’s winning probability in terms of the absolute anti commutator +, and then
bound it by a quantity that Alice can evaluate experimentally since it is a function of the Bell violation she estimates
during the testing phase.
We are now in a position to relate the guessing probability with the average incompatibility +. That’s to say we
show that,
Lemma 24. In (B19) we bounded the winning probability in terms of Λ, which can be further bounded as follows
Λ = 2−n
∑
k,b
pkpb|k max
θ′
∑
θ
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2−n∑
w
min (1, g (~+, w)) , (B47)
where w := θ′ ⊕ θ ∈ {0, 1}n, + =
∑
j∈J pjj, ~+ is the vector (+, +, . . . , +), and
g(~a,w) :=
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + ak
2
)wk/2
,
where ~a is a vector (a1, . . . , ak, . . . , an).
Proof. Define
g(b, w) =
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + bk
2
)wk/2
, w := θ′ ⊕ θ ∈ {0, 1}n. (B48)
When we apply Lemma 23 we get the bound
max
θ′
2−n
∑
θ
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2−n maxθ′ ∑
θ
min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
. (B49)
From (B48), we observe that
max
θ′
∑
θ
min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
=
∑
w
min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
(B50)
because the objective function to be maximized is independent of θ′. The objective function in the optimization
of (B19) can be bounded as ∑
k,b
pkpb|k max
θ′
∑
θ
2−n
∥∥∥∥√Πθ′,kb √Πθ,kb ∥∥∥∥ (B51)
≤
∑
k,b
pkpb|k2−n
∑
w
min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
, (B52)
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where the inner expression is independent of k. This is the uniform bound we mentioned. Performing the sum over
k first gives ∑
k
pkpb|k =
(B15)
∑
k
pk tr(Sb ⊗ 1B′ρkAB′Sb ⊗ 1B′) (B53)
= tr(Sb ⊗ 1B′K ρAB′K Sb ⊗ 1B′K) (B54)
= tr(Sbσ
⊗n
A Sb) =
n∏
k=1
tr(SbkσASbk) =
n∏
k=1
pbk =: pb. (B55)
where pbk for bk ∈ J has been defined before (B7).
Hence we see explicitly that while the attack of Bob may induce pb|k non-i.i.d. for some k, on average he cannot
influence Alice’s local i.i.d. state and therefore pb remains i.i.d.
Swapping the order of summation over b and w and pulling the summation over b inside the minimum (which can
only increase the value) gives the upper bound
2−n
∑
b,w
pb min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
(B56)
≤ 2−n
∑
w
min
(
1,
∑
b
pbg(b, w)
)
(B57)
The sum inside the minimum, ∑
b
pbg(b, w) =
∑
b
pb
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + bk
2
)wk/2
, (B58)
is a product of sums because pb is a product (see eq. B55):∑
b
pbg(b, w) =
√
d
n∏
k=1
∑
j∈J
pj
(
1 + j
2
)wk/2
. (B59)
Now each sum in the product can be bounded because of the concavity of the square root we get∑
b
pbg(b, w) ≤
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + +
2
)wk/2
= g (~+, w) (B60)
hence we have
2−n
∑
b,w
pb min
(
1, g(b, w)
)
(B61)
≤ 2−n
∑
w
min (1, g (~+, w)) (B62)
where + =
∑
j∈J pjj and ~+ is the vector (+, +, . . . , +)
The following Lemma forms the main result of this appendix. It bounds the winning probability λ(n, d, ζ) by a
function of d and ζ
Lemma 25. In the perfect guessing game where Alice’s devices behave i.i.d. and Bob has a quantum memory of
dimension d, his winning probability is bounded by
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2−n
[
t∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
+
√
d
n∑
k=t+1
(
n
k
)(
1 + ζ
2
)k/2]
, (B63)
where t is the threshold defined as
t :=
⌊
− log d ·
[
log
(
1 + ζ
2
)]−1⌋
(B64)
and ζ := S4
√
8− S2 with S being the CHSH violation as defined in Lemma 4.
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Proof. Combine (B62) with (B48) and (B19) and note that the maximizations over all strategies of Bob drop out
because we have bounded the winning probability of an arbitrary strategy. Therefore, we obtain
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2−n
∑
w
min
{
1,
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + +
2
)wk/2}
. (B65)
Using Lemma 4 we have + ≤ ζ and then
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2−n
∑
w
min
{
1,
√
d
n∏
k=1
(
1 + ζ
2
)wk/2}
. (B66)
Since the right-hand side depends only on the Hamming weight of w ∈ {0, 1}n it is easy to perform the minimization
explicitly, which yields
λ(n, d, ζ) ≤ 2−n
[
t∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
+
√
d
n∑
k=t+1
(
n
k
)(
1 + ζ
2
)k/2]
, (B67)
where t is the threshold defined in the Lemma.
